5 Some Reasons for Considering Greater Human Diversity

Those supporting the view that bio-diversity should include redesigning humans have to develop strategies to further their cause because Man would be an 'artifactual object' if remodeled in the ways discussed above. Those that wish to promote the vision of a widened biodiversity in which *homo sapiens* would be one of the species implicated will either have to directly modify the moral position of humans in the world or show the strategic advantages to becoming robotic individuals, transhuman, or posthuman, and this may help people re-examine their traditional values.

Looking at the transhumanist movement shows that the values put forth, whether one sees them to be acceptable or not, are done so within the framework that includes as conditions the following: Global Security, Technological Progress, Wide Access (see Bostrom (2005, 13)). Any sensible being shares these conditions and would like to have them protected, which means that in starting to change society in the way they see fit, the movement is not so off-tilt as some might say. The problem is the transhumanist movement sees nothing wrong with tampering with nature, using technology to extend lives and promoting libertarianism. Have we not been tampering with nature for a long time, i.e., controlling animal numbers, abortion, and exterminating unwanted entities? Although this does not alone justify greater human diversity, it shows that Man has always had the tendency to "diversify" in one way or another.

Accepting such a change would be a strategic move if it were used to unite people. Allowing only weaker members of society to better themselves would enable them to gain back their dignity. But would creating laws prohibiting naturally endowed persons access to such modifications be unfair? It is clear that if the biodiversity of man is to be accepted by the average citizen, any discourse on the matter will have to be situated at the level of this type of proposition.

When one considers the argumentation necessary to change things, it is tempting to say that the physical aspects of human life are quite malleable in comparison to its non-manifest "components". Bostrom[1] gives us an indication of the tools we would need to change the mindsets of those opposed to these practices. He suggests that the necessary ideals we will need are to be found outside of our *bios*. We must therefore act on our *logos* to better fathom the advent of change, to better "calculate" it. It is only if we focus on human reason that we will be able to accept our own redesign.

To relate this last comment to the machine-based approach, it can be said that the machine may have another type of corporal existence than Man does, but the *logos* is the same: Man's. If and when the intelligent robotics approach obtains an

[1] "The realm of posthuman values does not entail that we should forego our current values. The posthuman values can be our current values, albeit ones that we have not yet clearly comprehended. Transhumanism does not require us to say that we should favor posthuman beings or human beings, but that the right of way of favoring human beings is by enabling us to realize our ideals better and that some of our ideals may well be located outside the space of modes of being that are accessible to us with our current biological constitution". Cf. Bostrom (2005, 8).

independent capacity to reason, in the human sense, the categorization problem will have to be treated more thoroughly.

The reader may find that I have failed to transcend the practical aspects of modifying man correctly to develop sound arguments for expanding human diversity. However, pulling one way or another was not the goal here. This discussion reminds me of Paul Ricœur's stance on the impossible adjustment between our finite body and our infinitely open capacity for reason: although the two levels of discourse are complementary, their refusal to blend is what leads to our mistakes and miscalculations and renders the whole process of decision-making fallible. But I do hope to have provided the elements that are essential for engaging dialogue on these matters.

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